The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else's successful authentication.

The authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device's identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachymini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetoothservice.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other.

Once any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced.

This is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root.

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachymini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(getappmanager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential.

The endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through installpackage in src/reachymini/apps/sources/localcommonvenv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker.

How far this reaches depends on the model. In resolvebindhost in src/reachymini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials.

One related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.